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Conservationrbors some of the world's richest biological diversity. During the twentieth
century, two types of actors cleared that forest: native Amazonians and outside encroachers. Of the two
actors, we know more about what drives outside encroachers to clear forest than about what drives native
Amazonians to clear forest. The past research focus has served well because during the twentieth century
outside encroachers cleared most of the Amazonian forest. But the past research focus needs to be expanded
because native Amazonians are claiming de jure stewardship of the forests they inhabit, and with tighter
jurisdiction over those forests will likely come changes in the amount of forest native Amazonians clear. Prior
research in rural areas of low-income nations suggests that household income affects household forest
clearance. To estimate the effects of household real income on the total forest area (old-growth+fallow)
cleared by households we use a panel composed of ﬁve annual household surveys (2002–2006, inclusive)
from 324 households of a native Amazonian society in Bolivia (Tsimane'). We control for household and
village ﬁxed effects and use an instrumental variable for household income. We ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant
household real income elasticities of forest clearance of 0.35 and 0.47 and an increase in forest clearance of
5.3%/year. The main ﬁnding stood up well to sensitivity analysis. These estimates suggest that in the near
future, the forest in the Tsimane' territory will likely face increasing pressure from the Tsimane' themselves,
not just from outside encroachers.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. IntroductionThe Amazon rain forest harbors some of the world's richest
biological diversity (Malhi et al., 2008; Whinnett et al., 2005). During
the twentieth century two types of actors cleared the Amazon rain
forest (hereafter forest): native Amazonians and outside encroachers
(London and Kelly, 2007). Traditionally, households of native Amazo-
nians practiced slash-and-burn farming to plant chieﬂy subsistence
crops. They cleared the forest to sow crops for 1–3 consecutive years,
and then abandoned the plot. During the past two decades, householdsvreyes@brandeis.edu
ard1@northwestern.edu
@brandeis.edu (T. Huanca),
ll rights reserved.of native Amazonians have continued to clear the forest to plant
subsistence crops, but they have also started to clear the forest to put in
cash crops (Vadez et al., 2004) and large domesticated animals, such as
cattle and pigs (Bremmer and Lu, 2006; Lu, 2007; Rudel et al., 2002a,b).
Unlike forest clearing for slash-and-burn farming, forest clearing for
pastureland and for commercial farming generally entails the perma-
nent removal of forest. In recent years, native Amazonians have also
started to clear forest permanently to stakeprivate claims to landbefore
outside encroachers step in. Outside encroachers include cattle
ranchers, logging ﬁrms, road builders, oil ﬁrms, coca cultivators, and
colonist farmers (Godoy et al., 1998). Outside encroachers have cleared
forests in theAmazon to plantpasture for cattle, to cultivate commercial
crops (e.g., soybeans), to build physical infrastructure, and to claim land
(Hecht et al., 1988; Painter and Durham,1995; Repetto and Gillis, 1988;
Schmink and Wood, 1992; Wood and Porro, 2002; Wunder, 2000).
Unlike most of the forest cleared by native Amazonians, forest clearing
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forest to pastureland or to farmland.
Of the two actors, we know more about what drove outside en-
croachers to clear forest than about what drives native Amazonians to
clear forest. The past research focus has served well because during
the twentieth century outside encroachers cleared most of the
Amazonian forest (Barbier, 2004; Killeen et al., 2007). But the past
research focus needs to be expanded because native Amazonians are
claiming de jure stewardship of the forests they inhabit (Nepstad et al.,
2006; Redford and Stearman, 1993; Rudel et al., 2002b), and with
tighter jurisdiction over those forests will likely come changes in the
amount of forest native Amazonians clear.
Several studies have examined the relation between household
income (hereafter income) and household forest clearance (hereafter
forest clearance) among native Amazonians. Vadez et al. (2008)
pooled three consecutive annual household surveys (2000, 2001, and
2002) froma panel study of the Tsimane' (a native Amazonian group in
Bolivia) and regressed the area of forest cleared by the household
(outcome variable) against household income, the natural logarithm
(hereafter log) of area under rice cultivation, an index of market
dependence, anddummyvariables for villages. They foundpositive but
insigniﬁcant associations between household income and the clear-
ance of (a) old-growth forest or (b) total forest, deﬁned as old-growth
forest plus fallow forest. Drawing on a cross-sectional survey done
during 1996 among 209 Tsimane' households in 18 villages, Pendleton
and Howe (2001) regressed separately the area of old-growth forest,
fallow forest, and total forest cleared (outcome variables) against the
prices of maize, rice, and bananas, while controlling for individual and
community attributes. They found that the price of bananas and rice
bore a positive association with the area of old-growth forest cleared,
but they also found that the price of maize bore a negative association
with the area of old-growth forest cleared; the price of bananas, rice, or
maize did not affect the area of fallow forest cleared. Godoy (2001)
drew on one cross-sectional household survey among four lowland
groups of native Amazonians in Bolivia (Tsimane', Mojeño, Yuracaré,
and Chiquitano) and found that only farm income bore a positive
association with the area of old-growth forest cleared; wage income
did not affect the area of old-growth forest cleared. Total income, or
earnings from the sale of farm goods and from wage labor, bore no
signiﬁcant association with the area of old-growth forest cleared,
except among the Yuracaré (n=62). Among the Yuracaré, the relation
between the area of old-growth forest cleared and total household
income resembled an inverted U.
These studies suggest that the relation between household income
and household forest clearance among native Amazonians varies
across time and space, a point underscored by other researchers
writing more broadly about forest clearance in rural areas of low-
income nations (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1998, 1999; Barbier and
Burgess, 2001). Prior studies about forest clearance and income among
native Amazonians have produced suggestive but fragile results in part
because they have not corrected for the endogeneity of income.1 First,
because the studies relied on cross-sectional data from households —
or on pooled panel data analyzed as a cross section (e.g., Vadez et al.,
2008) — they could not control for ﬁxed attributes of households that
affected both forest clearance and income. Examples of such attributes
include role models, local ecological knowledge of household heads
(Reyes-García et al., 2007), and a household's stock of health. Second,
income might affect forest clearance, but forest clearance might affect
income.Noneof the studies just reviewed control for possible two-way1 Other possible reasons for the weak results include: (a) random errors in the
measure of income, (b) low levels of income, typical of indigenous populations in Latin
America (Hall and Patrinos, 2006; Lunde et al., 2007), (c) small variation in income
levels, (d) small sample size, and (e) small variation in the area of old-growth or fallow
forest cleared, with heavy left-hand censoring for each type of forest (Pendleton and
Howe, 2001).causality between forest clearance and income. Third, these studies
have failed to take into account that forest clearance among native
Amazonians is a multidimensional activity that is part consumption,
part income, part savings, and part investment. Because native
Amazonian societies are highly autarkic, and because prices are non-
existent or spotty, one cannot mechanically apply a demand and
supply framework or other conventional modeling approaches that
work well in more developed economies.
Given the hurdles in empirical estimations of how household
income might affect household forest clearance, here we draw on a
panel data set composed of ﬁve consecutive annual household surveys
(2002–2006, inclusive) from 324 households in one native Amazo-
nian society in Bolivia, the Tsimane', to achieve the following aims:
(1) Provide a descriptive model of how total household income
affects the clearance of local forest by households without
making assumptions about the existence or quality of markets
for capital or labor, and
(2) Improve the precision of prior estimates by doing the following:
(a) using an instrumental-variable approach to control for the
endogeneity of household income, (b) controlling for ﬁxed
attributes of villages eachyear, (c) controlling forﬁxed attributes
of households across allﬁve years of the study, (d) controlling for
year effects, and (e) using multiple observations of forest
clearance for each household across the ﬁve years of the study.
We stress total household income rather than different types of
household income (e.g., earnings fromwage labor or earning from the
sale of farm and forest goods) because income from wage labor and
from the sale of farm or forest goods were heavily censored at zero
(see below), so combining different sources of income into one
variable produces more variation in household income, our chief
explanatory variable. In adding different sources of incomewe give up
the possibility of identifying how different types of income might
affect forest clearance, but our approach has merit because much of
the earlier research (e.g., Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1998, 1999) has
already highlighted the role of different types of income on forest
clearance. We stress the clearance of local forest or forest surrounding
a village because a rise in the level of household income could induce
native Amazonians to clear forests beyond their villages.2 If so, then
estimates of the relation between the clearance of local forests and
incomewould yield an incomplete portrait of how income levels affect
the total amount of forest cleared. We believe that the stress on the
clearance of local forest captures most of the forest cleared by native
Amazonians because — to our knowledge — native Amazonians have
not started to displace forest clearance beyond their villages, though
this is a theoretical possibility we cannot dismiss.
2. Data
For this article we draw on data from an annual panel study in
progress among the Tsimane' that started in 2002 (Leonard and
Godoy, 2008). Information was collected annually during June–
September from all Tsimane' in 13 Tsimane' villages along theManiqui
River, department of Beni. The panel includes about 250 households
and 1500 people. Villages differ in their proximity to the market town
of San Borja (mean=25.96 km; standard deviation [SD]=16.70), the
only town along the Maniqui River. Four Bolivian university graduates
conducted the survey and four Tsimane' who worked in the study
from its inception served as translators. The complete data set and its
documentation, alongwith publications from the project, are available
for public use at the following web address: http://people.brandeis.
edu/~rgodoy/.2 See Suri and Chapman (1998) for a review of the literature of how industrial
nations displace environmental costs to low-income nations.
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The Tsimane' number about 8000 people and live in about 100
villages in the Bolivian Amazon, mostly along the Maniqui and the
Apere rivers in the department of Beni. The Tsimane' economy centers
on hunting, ﬁshing, plant foraging, and on slash-and-burn farming.
Prior studies among the Tsimane' contain ethnographic descrip-
tions and discussions of forest clearance (Godoy, 2001; Reyes-García
et al., 2007; Vadez et al., 2004; Pendleton andHowe, 2001) and income
sources (Godoy et al., 2007). These studies point to four ﬁndings that
bear on this article. First, self-reported answers about forest clearance
provided by plot owners bore a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
association with measures of forest clearance taken by researchers
(Vadez et al., 2003). Therefore, the measure of the outcome variable
used in this article— self-reported answers about the clearance of old-
growth forest or fallow forest — provides a reasonably accurate
estimate of actual forest clearance. Second, the price of rice (Pendleton
and Howe 2001) and the cultivation of rice as a cash crop accounts for
an increasingly important share of the area of forest cleared by
households (Vadez et al., 2008). Third, the ethnobotanical knowledge
of themale head of a household is associatedwith less forest clearance
(Reyes-García et al., 2007). Fourth, the Tsimane' remain highly autarkic
(Godoy et al., 2007). For example, among people over 16 years of age,
74.88% of the sample reported no earnings fromwage labor and 56.40%
of the sample reported no earnings from the sale of farm or forest
goods for the two weeks before the day of the interview.
We next provide a description of the institutions regulating
usufruct rights to forest, of why Tsimane' clear forest, of how they
clear the forest, and of their sources of income.
3.1. Institutional arrangement
Tsimane' practice farming in their ancestral lands (Huanca, 2008).
Tsimane' land legally belongs to the entire ethnic group; Tsimane'
cannot buy or sell land to each other or to outsiders. In a typical village,
houses lie scattered around the school, and households usually farm
around the village in a radius of about 2 km. The forest available to
each household for farming depends on the number of households in
the village and on the abundance of forest surrounding the village.
During the study period the mean and the median number of
households in a village were 25 and 17 (SD=17), and the average
household had 6.35 people (SD=2.83).
Tsimane' households typically clear some old-growth forest and
some fallow forest. Cleared plots have informal owners; those who
cleared a plot of old-growth forest have usufruct rights to continue
using the cleared plot for farming, or to use forest products from the
cleared plot as it reverts back to forest. Years after last using a plot for
farming, Tsimane'will rememberwho initially cleared the plot andwho
has ﬁrst rights to the fallow forest on that plot. Tsimane' plant a variety
of useful plants on clearedplots as the clearedplot reverts back to fallow
forest; they put in plants as property markers, or as a way to claim
usufruct rights to the land as it reverts back to fallow forest. Theseplants
also serve for food, construction material, medicines, and other ends
(Huanca,1999). In practice, the right to use a fallow forest is lax. People
whodidnot initially clear a plot of old-growth forest are able to clear the
plot for farming after it has become a fallow forest, or simply extract
some of the planted tree crops or fruit trees in the fallow forest.
Cleared plots or fallow forests generally remain unfenced. When
cattle or domesticated pigs threaten planted crops, Tsimane' either
build a fence on a cleared plot to enclose their own domesticated
animals (see below), or else put a fence around part of the village to
halt the advance of cattle from outsiders and, in so doing, protect the
property of all villagers.
Tsimane' believe that all plants and animals were human in mythical
times, and that the gods converted some of those early humans into
today's animals and plants. Because Tsimane' believe that humans,animals, and plants share a common ancestry, they view plants and
animals as their kin, and, consequently, have a reverential attitude toward
the plants and animals of their forest (Huanca, 2008). For instance, as
they prepare to clear a patch of old-growth forest for farming, Tsimane'
will ask the spirit of large trees for permission before cutting themdown.
3.2. Reasons for forest clearance by Tsimane'
Tsimane' households clear the forest for multiple ends. First, and
most importantly, they clear the forest to plant some of their main
subsistence (typically annual) farm crops, such as manioc, maize, rice,
and plantains. Less important subsistence farm crops include peanuts,
sugar cane, sweet potatoes, and citrus (Vadez et al., 2008; Piland,1991).
Second, more and more households — particularly those near market
towns (Vadez et al., 2004) — clear forest to plant rice for sale (Vadez
et al., 2008). Farm crops (particularly rice) account formore thanhalf of
the incomeof households (Vadez et al., 2008). The global increase in the
price of food during 2008 has induced some Tsimane' to explore the
possibility of seeking bank credit to hire Tsimane' workers and clear
more forest to plant additional rice. Third, some Tsimane' have started
to clear small parcels of forest to put in cattle and pigs. The animals
represent a form of investment or saving, useful when unexpected
needs for cash arise. Typically fed byallowing them to roam freely in the
village common and eat scraps, natural vegetation, and planted crops,
large domesticated animals impose a cost on other villagers; they eat
crops and clothing, and even kill some of the smaller domesticated
animals. As a result, households that own large domesticated animals
clear forest to build corrals for their animals to reduce conﬂicts with
other villagers. Fourth, as noted, households clear forest as a form of
investment. Abandoned forests which Tsimane' once farmed have
owners. Villagers recognize that those who ﬁrst cleared a plot of old-
growth forest have the right to the fallow forest that grows back after
abandoning the cleared plot (Huanca, 1999).
3.3. Method of forest clearance
Tsimane' clear forest during the dry season, between May and
August, and let the tree trunks and bramble dry from exposure to the
hot sun of the dry season. They use cutlasses and metal axes to clear
the forest and the underbrush. Planting of annual crops takes during
August–December, and harvest takes place during the rainy season
(January–April). Men tend to cut the large trees, but women and men
jointly carry out most subsequent farm tasks (e.g., weeding, harvest-
ing). Tsimane' rely on household laborers to clear the forest, but
Tsimane' who work for wages, such as school teachers or wage
laborers in logging camps or cattle ranches, will hire other villagers to
clear the forest or rent chainsaws from loggers or cattle ranchers;
8.23% of households reported using chainsaws to clear the forest.
Tsimane' use plots for 1–2 year consecutive years before abandoning
the plot, but in villages with higher population pressure and in villages
closer to market towns, Tsimane' tend to shorten the fallow.
3.4. Sources of income
Among the Tsimane', the sources of income include: (a) sale of
farm crops, principally rice, but also plantains, maize, manioc, and
fruits, (b) sale of forest products, principally thatch palm and timber,
but also honey, ﬁrewood, and ﬁsh, (c) wage labor in logging camps,
cattle ranches, and in the homestead of colonist farmers, (d) salaried
work as school teachers or for local institutions, and (e) (often
distress) sale of domesticated animals (Godoy et al., 2007).
4. Modeling forest clearance among native Amazonians
How one models forest clearance by households among native
Amazonians depends on the question posed. The central motivation
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income — irrespective of the income source — on the area of forest
cleared by a household. In highly autarkic economies, the choice of
model is far from straightforward because households clear forest for
multiple ends: to produce food and other goods (e.g., construction
material) for their own consumption, to produce forest and farm
goods for sale or for monetary income, or to invest (e.g., land clearing
to put in cattle and stake claims to land). Because in highly autarkic
rural settings consumption, production, and income overlap so much,
and because the supply and demand framework operates poorly
owing to the absence of fully functioning markets for inputs and
outputs, standard approaches are questionable.
If one views forest clearance chieﬂy as a form of investment or
saving, then one would need village interest rates, which are missing
in autarky. If one views forest clearance as a form of income, then one
would need prices for farm crops, forest crops, and for wages, also
missing in autarky. Equating forest clearance with income would also
require a convincing measure of human capital to estimate a standard
earnings function, but the measure of human capital in a highly
autarkic setting is problematic. Should one use a proxy for modern
human capital (e.g., schooling) or a proxy for local or traditional
knowledge of the environment (e.g., ethnobotanical knowledge)?
And, if the latter, how would one measure traditional knowledge?
Last, if one views forest clearance as a form of consumption, then one
would need to deﬁne temporary income in such a way that it excludes
own consumption (a hard task in autarky since much of people's
income is their consumption).
When faced with a complex, messy reality in which consumption,
production, income, and investments overlap, one requires a gentler,
less orthodox approach than one might use in a more formal economy.
Because it remains unclear what theory might be most appropriate to
the task at hand, here we provide a descriptive econometric model of
forest clearance. By this we simply mean that we regress the total area
of forest cleared by a household against household income while
controlling for a wide range of standard covariates used in studies of
household deforestation (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1998, 1999), but
take seriously the task of removing the endogeneity biases of household
income.
5. Hypothesis
Wehypothesize that total forest clearance should bear a non-linear
relation with respect to household income, and this is because
household income will simultaneous increase and decrease forest
clearance. We next explain the rationale behind the hypothesis.
Income should increase forest clearance through three paths. First,
if income comes from the sale of farm goods, then higher prices for
farm goods will increase household income and household forest
clearance (Pascual and Barbier, 2007; Pendleton and Howe, 2001).
Second, if households clear forest mainly to produce food for their
own consumption, then one should also expect that higher levels of
household income will increase the area of forest cleared by house-
holds because most of the foods from forest clearance are likely to be
normal goods, at least among the Tsimane'.3 Third, if forest clearance is
a form of savings or investment, then one should expect higher levels
of income to correlate with more deforestation; with higher income,
people are more likely to increase investments in their land by staking
claims to land, and with higher income people are also more likely to
save in domesticated animals owing to the absence of rural banks.
But counterbalancing these forces toward more forest clearance
from greater household income, one should also ﬁnd pressure to
lower forest clearance as household income increases. Higher income3 For example, Alarcón and Immink (1999) ﬁnd positive income elasticities of
consumption for maize, rice, beans, wheat, roots, and most other foods among low-
income urban slum dwellers in Guatemala City.implies a higher opportunity cost for rural workers, particularly if they
can ﬁnd employment outside of the village economy (e.g., logging
camps, cattle ranches), andwith a higher opportunity cost, one should
expect less forest clearance, as suggested by several studies reviewed
by Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1998). Furthermore, as one reviewer
pointed out, another reason for a negative relation between forest
clearance and income could be that some subsistence crops planted in
cleared forest may not be normal goods. As income increases house-
holds may substitute away from these subsistence crops to market
goods. Unfortunately, our data on potentially inferior goods (e.g.,
manioc) is too spotty to test this idea.
6. Estimation strategy
We use the following linear approximation to estimate the effect of
total household income on the clearance of forest by a household:
lnYhvt = α + γ ln Ihvt + δ ln Ið Þ2hvt + ηChvt + βVt + ehvt ð1Þ
In Eq. (1), lnY stands for the log of the total area of forest cleared by
household h in village v at time (or year) t, where total area of forest
cleared captures the sum of the area of old-growth forest and fallow
forest cleared by a household. Explanatory variables include: (a) lnI
stands for the logof inﬂation-adjusted (hereafter real) incomeearnedby
all people over 16 years of age in the household from the sale of goods,
wage labor, and barter transactions, divided by the number of people in
the household, (b) (lnI)2 is the quadratic term for the log of real income
of the household (lnI), (c) C includes control variables (e.g., access to
credit, household size, schooling, health), which tend to affect both
forest clearance and household income (Angelsen and Kaimowitz,1998,
1999), and (d) V includes a full set of dummy variables for villages to
control for attributes of villages that remained ﬁxed during the study
period and that affect forest clearance and income (e.g., propinquity to
town, prices, institutions, forest stocks). Table 1 containsmore details on
how we measured the variables in Eq. (1). We express all monetary
values in real terms; the notes to Table 1 contain a description of
the deﬂators used. Table 2 contains summary statistics of the main
variables used in the regression analysis. We estimate the parameters of
Eq. (1) using a household ﬁxed-effect panel linear regression and a two-
stage least-squares instrumental variable panel regression.
The strategy outlined so far allows us to redress many of the biases
that plague naïve estimates of the effect of household income on
household deforestation, but it does not allow us to remove all the
biases from the potential endogeneity of household income. For this
reason, in the next section we discuss the use of an instrumental
variable for household income.
7. Instrumental variable for household income
In this section we describe the four steps followed to identify the
instrumental variable for household income, and justify the use of the
instrumental variable.
7.1. Step 1: why might income be endogenous?
An estimate of the effect of household income on forest clearance
might be biased by the role of omitted variables that were not swept
away by the other explanatory variables of Eq. (1). This could happen
if household-level variables changed over time and: (a) affected forest
clearance and income or (b) were not included in expression (1). For
instance, the use of a household ﬁxed-effect model would remove the
role of the stock of household ecological knowledge, or that part of
ecological knowledge that remained ﬁxed during the ﬁve years of the
panel study, but if ecological knowledge (or other variables measured
at the household level) changed over the study period, then this might
bias the estimated parameter of income.
Table 1
Deﬁnition of variables measured annually, 2002–2006 (inclusive), used in the regressions (number of households=324)
Name of variable in Tables 2–3 Deﬁnition
Dependent variable
Log total forest area cleared⁎ Natural logarithm of sum of old-growth and fallow forest cleared during the year before the interview. Raw variable measured
in tareas (10 tareas=1 ha). 4.36% of observations left censored.
Explanatory variables
Log household real income/person⁎, ⁎⁎ Log of mean, real (i.e., inﬂation-adjusted) income/person in household earned during the two weeks before the day of
the interview. Income sources include sales, barter, and wage labor and were collected only for people≥16 years of age
(or younger if they headed a household). Total household income divided by head count in household. In the regression we also
include the quadratic of the log of real income/person.
Log household real monetary wealth/person⁎ Log of real monetary value of household's wealth measured with ﬁve traditional physical assets (e.g., canoes, bows), 13 modern
physical assets (e.g., radios, cutlasses), and four domesticated animals (e.g., cattle, chickens, ducks) owned by the household.
Value divided by household head count to arrive at an estimate of the mean value of wealth/person in the household.⁎
Schooling years Sum of the maximum school grade achieved by all members of the household
Bed-ridden days Total number of bed-ridden days by all members of the household during the 14 days before the day of the interview.
Household size Number of people in the household
Credit Number of people in household with self-reported access to credit in a future emergency
Number plots cleared Number of forest plots cleared.
Survey year Year of survey
⁎ +1 added before taking natural logarithms.
⁎⁎ To obtain real values, we used the deﬂators from the Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales y Económicas (UDAPE), a policy analysis bureau of the Bolivian government. The
information was downloaded on March 3, 2008 from the following web address of UDAPE: http://www.udape.gov.bo/ (Table 1.1.5, Deﬂactores implícitos del PIB por rama de
actividad económica). The deﬂators (base=1990) were: 2002=222.23, 2003=231.50, 2004=257.70, 2005=235.14, and 2006=247.85.
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in the village as an instrumental variable for the level of household income
We equate household rank with the place of the household in the
income hierarchy of all households in a village each year.We assigned a
rank of one (or 100%) to the household with the highest income in a
village during the ﬁrst year.We express the rank of all other households
in the village during the ﬁrst year as a share of the income earned by the
richest household in the village during the ﬁrst year. For example, if
during the ﬁrst year a village had three households — one household
each earning (i) 100 bolivianos (richest household), (ii) 80 bolivianos
(second richest household), and (iii) 60 bolivianos (third richest
household, or the poorest household) — then the three households
wouldhave the following ranks: (i) 1 (100/100), (ii) 0.80 (80/100), and
(iii) 0.60 (60/100). We repeated the steps to obtain a measure of
household rank for each household for each of the next four years.
Household rank in income correlates highlywith the level of household
income because we used the level of household income to create a
measure of household rank in income, but household rank in income
probably does not correlate directly with the amount of forest cleared
by the household because households clear forest for a variety of ends,
but not to change their rank. Forest clearance could only inﬂuence
household rank in income through the level of household income. It is
possible that households with higher rank might feel the need to clear
forests to put in cattle to show off their rank; if so, then household rank
in income and household forest clearance would be correlated directlyTable 2
Summary statistics of main variables used in the regressions
Name of variable Observations Mean SD
Dependent variable
Log total forest area cleared 819 2.24 0.65
Explanatory variables
Log household real income/person 824 0.56 0.37
Log household real monetary wealth/person 813 0.66 0.39
Schooling years 824 7.67 5.71
Bed-ridden days 824 5.00 3.39
Household size 824 1.72 0.50
Credit 824 0.80 1.16
Number plots cleared 820 1.67 0.97via cattle,without beingmediated by household income.We control for
this possibility by including household wealth as a control variable. As
indicated in Table 1, the measure of household wealth captures the
monetary value of domesticated animals (including cattle and pigs)
owned by the household each year, and so allows us to control for that
part of the instrumental variable that might be directly correlated with
household forest clearance. One additional argument for using house-
hold rank in income as an instrumental variable for the level of
household income deserves mention. Rank is not a variable over which
a household has complete control; a householdmight decide to change
its rank, but theﬁnal rank in incomeof a household in avillage eachyear
will depend on the decisions (and income) of other households over
which it has less or no control.
7.3. Step 3: testing whether household income is exogenous
To test whether household income is exogenous, we ran a re-
gression with the measure of household income as a dependent
variable; as explanatory variables we included the potential instru-
mental variable for household income — household rank in income —
and all the other explanatory variables shown in column [1] of Table 3.
From this regressionwe obtained a predicted residual, ŝ. We then used
the regression of column [1], Table 3, but added the residual, ŝ, as a
regressor. We found a p value for the residual of 0.69, so we accept the
null hypothesis that household income is exogenous.4
7.4. Step 4: statistical test for the validity of the instrumental variable
We estimated the regression in column [1], Table 3, but added the
variable for household rank in income. If household rank in income is
a valid instrumental variable for household income, then it should
bear a tenuous link with forest clearance after conditioning for
household income, and that is what we found. We found that the
coefﬁcient of household rank in income was−0.08 (p=0.69) but the
coefﬁcient of household income was 0.43 (p=0.11), slightly higher
than the coefﬁcient of column [1] (coefﬁcient=0.35; p=0.04). A
reliable instrumental variable should also be highly correlated with
the endogenous regressor (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). To test this we
regressed household income (outcome variable) against all the
explanatory variables of column [1](Table 3) plus household rank in
Table 3
Effects of household real income per person and household forest clearance among
Tsimane', Bolivia: regression results using annual panel data (2002–2006)
Explanatory variables Dependent variables— natural logarithm
of total forest area cleared by household
(total=old-growth forest+fallow forest)
[1] [2]
Log household real income 0.35⁎⁎ 0.47⁎⁎
Square of log household real income −0.188⁎ −0.28⁎
Log household real monetary wealth/person −0.08 0.39⁎⁎
Schooling years 0.008 −0.006
Bed-ridden days 0.004 −0.003
Household size 0.10 0.44
Credit −0.004 0.01
Number plots cleared 0.29⁎⁎⁎ 0.34⁎⁎⁎
Survey year 0.05⁎⁎⁎ 0.05⁎⁎⁎
Log income and square of log income:
Joint test: F or χ2 and (pNF or pNχ2) F=2.08 (0.12) χ2=4.58 (0.10)
Inﬂection point (bolivianos) 0.95 0.82
Observations 808
R2 overall 0.32 0.40




Note: Regressions are panel linear models and include clustering by household, full set of
dummy variables for communities, constant (not shown), and robust standard errors. For
column [1] joint test is F and, in parenthesis, pNF; for column [2], joint test is χ2 and, in
parenthesis,pNχ2. IV=instrumental variable. IV for household real income=household's
income rank in the village eachyear (e.g., richest household=1, next richest household=
%of income of richest household). Inﬂectionpoint=household real income beyondwhich
forest clearancebegins to fall (+)or rise (−); baselinemean real incomeperperson=0.56
real bolivianos; inﬂection point estimated through ﬁrst derivative. See notes to Table 1 for
deﬂators used. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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1.14 and a t statistics of 28.33. From this we conclude that the use of
household rank in income is a conceptually and statistically sensible
instrumental variable for household income.
In sum, we ﬁnd strong statistical evidence that household income
might be exogenous and we also ﬁnd good evidence for the use of
household rank in income as a valid instrumental variable for house-
hold income. Column [2], Table 3, contains the result of the two-stage
least squares instrumental-variable panel linear estimation with two
instrumental variables for household income: (a) household rank in
income and (b) the square of household rank in income.We use (a) as
an instrumental variable for lnI and (b) as an instrumental variable for
(lnI)2 in Eq. (1).
8. Regression results
Table 3 contains the regression results. The results in column [1]
suggest that a 1%-increase in household income is associated with an
increase of 0.35% in the area of forest cleared by a household. The
quadratic term for the log of household income has a coefﬁcient of
−0.18 and is statistically insigniﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence interval
(p=0.09).We ﬁndweak evidence that the relation between the log of
total forest clearance by a household and the log of household income
resembles an inverted U. An F test for the joint statistical signiﬁcance
of the log of household income and the quadratic term for the log of
household income suggests that they are marginally signiﬁcant
(F=2.08, pNF=0.12). The two coefﬁcients imply that forest clearance
will fall once mean personal real income for a two-week period
reaches 0.95 bolivianos, 68.49% higher than the mean current personal
real income for a two-week period of only 0.56 bolivianos.54 For details on the methods used to test the exogeneity of income, see Wooldridge
(2003).
5 During 2002–2006, the average nominal exchange rate was 7.4 bolivianos to one
US dollar. International studies suggest that the turning point of forest clearance at
present is about 2–3 times higher than mean current income (Barbier and Burgess,
2001).In column [2] we use household rank in real income as an instru-
mental variable for the level of household income. Using instrumental
variables produces slightly stronger results than those in column [1].
When we use instrumental variables for the log of household real
income and for the square of the log of household real income, we ﬁnd
that a 1%-increase in income is associated with an increase in the total
amount of forest clearance of 0.47% (p=0.04); the quadratic term
for the log of household real income is −0.28, but not statistically
signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level (p=0.10), nor were the two
terms — log of household real income and the square of the log of
household real income— statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence
level (χ2=4.58, pNχ2=0.10).
One other result deserves brief mention even though it does not
bear directly on the main thrust of the article. The results of Table 3
suggest that the annual rate of total forest clearance was 5.32%
(column [1]) and 5.82% (column [2]), with conﬁdence levels above
99% in both cases.
Wedidadditional analysis (results not shown) to test the robustness
of the main results. We next discuss the results of the additional
analysis.
First, we used a household random-effect model rather than a
household ﬁxed-effect model for the regression in column [1] and
found slightly stronger results and better evidence that the link
between the log of household forest clearance and the log of house-
hold real income resembles an inverted U.6 For example, the
coefﬁcient for the log household real income was +0.39 (p=0.008)
and the coefﬁcient for the square term of the log of household real
income was−0.22 (p=0.02). The test of joint statistical signiﬁcance
produced a χ2 statistic of 7.13 and a pNχ2 of 0.02.
Second, we re-estimated the regression of column [1] using the
change in the log of forest clearance between year t+1 and year t; as
explanatory variables we used the ones shown in Table 3 (Stern,
2004). Those results show that the log of household real income and
the square of the log of household real income had virtually no effect
on the rate of change of forest clearance.
Third, we re-estimated the regression of column [1], but using,
separately, as outcome variables the two types of forests: the log of the
area of old-growth forest cleared, and the log of the area of fallow
forest cleared. Those results suggest that household real income had a
greater effect on the area of old-growth forest cleared than on the area
of fallow forest cleared, but with neither old-growth forest or with
fallow forest were results statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence
level or higher.
Fourth, we took out the variable for the log of household real
income and for the quadratic term of the log of household real income
and replaced them in the same regression of column [1], Table 3, with
two new variables that captured different source of real income: (a)
the log of household real monetary earnings fromwage labor and (b)
the log of household real monetary earnings from the sale of farm and
forest goods. We found that each of the two sources of monetary
income bore a positive associationwith forest clearance but in neither
case were results statistically signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient for the log of
household real monetary earnings from wage labor was +0.05
(p=0.54) and the coefﬁcient for the log of household real monetary
earnings from the sale of farm and forest goods was +0.06 (p=0.40).
These result supports our approach of combining the different sources
of income rather than treating them separately since each source of
income treated separately produces weak results owing to the high
share of zero values in each source ofmonetary income. At least among6 Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) note that ﬁxed-effect models might be more
appropriate in estimating the effect of income on forest clearance. Although we ran the
main regressions with household ﬁxed effects, in the robustness analysis we decided
to check and see whether results stood up to the use of a model with household
random effects.
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clearance seems to come from the role of total household income.
Fifth, the measure of incomewe used included the monetary value
of goods earned in barter transactions. We redeﬁned income to
exclude these goods and only include monetary earnings from wage
labor and monetary earnings from the sale of goods. We found that
changing the deﬁnition of income produced only slightly weaker
results than those of column [1], Table 3. The coefﬁcient of the log of
monetary income was +0.22 (p=0.068) (instead of +0.35) and the
coefﬁcient of the square of the log of monetary income was −0.10
(p=0.08) (instead of−0.18). The test of joint signiﬁcance of the two
terms produced an F statistics of 1.70 and a probability of exceeding
the F critical value of 0.18. This suggests that the main results we
obtained are fairly robust to the deﬁnition of income used.
Last, we used the approach of Pendleton and Howe (2001) to see
whether we could replicate their results. We used the area of total
forest clearance measured in tareas (10 tareas=1 ha) as an outcome
variable, and we used a lowered-censored tobit regression for the
estimation. As explanatory variables we included the village prices of
maize and rice, the distance to the nearest town (measured in hours
walking), household size, and mean schooling level in the household.
We could not include some of the variables used by Pendleton and
Howe because they are not part of the annual panel surveys used here;
the variables used by Pendleton and Howe, but excluded here, include
a measure of private time preference, the price of bananas and soap,
hunting success, and proximity of the village to a road. The results are
not strictly comparable because we use a panel with repeated
measures of the same household and we did not have data on some
of the variables used by Pendleton and Howe. This caveat aside, we
found essentially the same result as they did: maize prices bore no
signiﬁcant associationwith total forest clearance, but rice prices bore a
positive association with the total area of forest cleared. They found
that an increase of one boliviano in the village price of rice was
associated with an increase of 1.93 tareas of total forest cleared
(t=2.66). We found that an increase of one boliviano in the village
price of rice was associated with an increase of 0.47 tareas of total
forest cleared (t=3.44). The coefﬁcients for rice prices in the two
studies differ signiﬁcantly, but they both suggest that higher village
rice prices are associated with a greater amount of forest clearance by
households.
In sum, we ﬁnd: (a) positive household real income elasticities for
total forest clearance (%Δtotal forest clearance/1%Δ household real
income) of 0.35 (inﬂection point 0.95 bolivianos) and 0.47 (inﬂection
point 0.82 bolivianos), with the range depending on the type of
regression used, (b) suggestive but not strong evidence for an inverted
U-shaped relation between the log of household forest clearance and
log of household real income, (c) results that are robust to changes in
the deﬁnition of income, and (d) results that support and build on
results from earlier work of other researchers suggesting that rice
prices are associated with greater forest clearance.
9. Discussion and conclusions
As native Amazonian societies become empowered and gain legal
title to their land (Stocks, 2005), they will likely be more effective in
curbing encroachment into their land and gaining a stronger role in
deciding how much forest to clear and how much forest to leave
standing. Owing to the shortage of primary data on forest clearance
among native Amazonians, owing to the absence of appropriate
modeling approaches, and owing to the fact that native Amazonian
societies are highly autarkic, it is hard to fathom what will happen to
forest clearance as native Amazonian societies gain a stronger legal
say in how to manage natural resources within their territories.
In the short run, many variables within native Amazonian societies,
such as population growth, health, credit, and household income, will
likelydrive forest clearance bynativeAmazonians.Herewehave focusedon the role of one such variable — household real income — in shaping
household forest clearance. The focus on household income has merit
because income tends to shape many indicators of well being across
societies and because monetary income will grow in importance as
highly autarkic people gain a stronger foothold in the market economy.
We found positive and signiﬁcant real income elasticities of forest
clearance even after correcting for the endogeneity of household real
income, and even after controlling for ﬁxed effects of households and
villages. The elasticities we found, 0.35–0.47, imply that doubling real
incomewill induce 35–47%more forest clearance. Recall that previous
research found virtually no effect of income on forest clearance, so our
results contrast with past ﬁndings. The use of panel data allows us to
overcomemany of the data limitations of previous studies, and the use
of a sensible instrumental variable for household income, allows us to
overcome the possible endogeneity biases of household income.
We found weak evidence for the hypothesis that the relation
between the log of household forest clearance and log of household
real income was non-linear. The strength of the evidence hinged on
the econometric model used, with stronger evidence for an inverted
U-shaped relation when using instrumental variables or a random
effect model.
Income elasticities of forest clearance of 0.35–0.47 plus a secular
trend in forest clearance of 5.32–5.82%/year (after controlling for real
income and other covariates) suggest that in the short run the forest in
the Tsimane' territory will face increasing pressure from the Tsimane'
themselves, not just from outside encroachers. How much forest will
remain standing after taking into account internal pressures will
depend on the size of the territory and on the role of other variables.
For example, one study suggests that owing to the large amount of
forest available to the Matsigenka native Amazonian society in the
Manu National Park of Peru, forest clearing among Matsigenka might
not threaten conservation, at least not in the short run (Ohl-Schacherer
et al., 2007). But among societies with a smaller territory, income
growth will likely undermine forest conservation.
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